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This article applies social network analysis techniques to a case study of police corruption in 
order to produce findings which will assist in corruption prevention and investigation. Police 
corruption is commonly studied but rarely are sophisticated tools of analyse engaged to add 
rigour to the field of study. This article analyses the ‘First Joke’ a systemic and long lasting 
corruption network in the Queensland Police Force, a state police agency in Australia. It uses the 
data obtained from a commission of inquiry which exposed the network and develops hypotheses 
as to the nature of the networks structure based on existing literature into dark networks and 
criminal networks. These hypotheses are tested by entering the data into UCINET and analysing 
the outcomes through social network analysis measures of average path distance, centrality and 
density. The conclusions reached show that the network has characteristics not predicted by the 
literature. 
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Background 
 
Public officials who place their own interests before those of the public have corrupted a 
system in which they are supposed to act as agents of the public will (Lauchs 2007). 
Police are an essential part of the Australian justice system and are the frontline actors in 
keeping the peace and social stability and cohesion. Thus good governance relies on 
honest policing. However, there will always be at least a small group of corrupt police 
officers, even though Australians are culturally averse to corruption (Khatri et al. 2006). 
Police officer’s attract corruption because of their ability to enforce or ignore the law and 
police who are unethical or in financial stress are vulnerable to offers of illicit payments. 
Organised police corruption, which is a subset of organised crime, aggravates the 
situation because it threatens the community by undermining good governance. 
Organised police corruption constitutes “social behaviour, conducted in groups within 
organisations, that is powerful enough to override the officer’s oath of office, personal 
conscience, departmental regulations and criminal laws.” (Punch 2000) 
 
Organised corrupt policing is more dangerous than individual actions because 
collaboration between offenders can multiply their income; the income of the group is 
greater than the sum of the income of individuals acting apart (Morselli and Tremblay 
2004). There are many historical examples of powerful organised crime syndicates of 
predatory police establishing themselves within the Australian police services.  
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Policing bodies need to understand the nature and structure of these networks to 
be able to better identify and apprehend the targets of their investigations. As Warr has 
stated in relation to the policing of delinquents: “…it is difficult to imagine how 
investigators can develop, defend, or test general theories of delinquency without some 
knowledge of the organization and operation of delinquent groups” (Warr 1996).  
 
The necessity of studying criminal networks is well established but has not 
received much attention from social network theoretical approach (Morselli and 
Tremblay 2004; Moran 2005, 62). The main contribution of this article is that in 
uncovering hidden (or confirming) bribe and other corrupt exchanges and their associated 
influence tentacles it provides a better understanding of the nature, structure and 
socialisation processes of these embedded networks. Understanding how corrupt police 
networks are structured and their dynamics affords better opportunities for strategies to 
be developed to interrupt dark networks and re-enforce positive policing practices.  This 
study is a departure from current studies of criminal networks in that it draws on social 
network analysis to provide rigorous data to verify the characteristics of networks and 
particularly to uncover the hidden relationships that support them. 
 
This project will provide previously unavailable information on corrupt police 
networks in Australia. It is the first to study each of the separate inquiries into Australian 
police corruption and convert information from the inquiries into useful data for 
corruption prevention, detection or investigation; turn the unanalysed information and 
into actionable intelligence (Dean and Gottschalk 2007). The project will provide insights 
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into the structure and dynamics of their operation by unpacking the topology of their 
interconnections and increase understanding of points of intervention and strategies to 
sure up or insulate ‘good networks’ and stop them tipping over the edge and to the ‘dark 
side’. 
 
Although focused on the Queensland context, this article is part of a larger study 
that will interrogate corrupt police network across Australian jurisdictions. The article 
outlines and focuses on the first stage of the project being the corrupt police network in 
Queensland (Australia) called ‘the Joke’ that ran from the 1950s to the 1980s.  
 
Corrupt Networks  
 
Social networks form when people interact. Networks are a type of social organisation 
that rely on relationships of trust, mutuality and reciprocity, coupled with a set of 
common norms established and maintained through peer pressure, social approval and 
sanction (stigma), to bind individuals to a collective unit. The characteristic ability of 
networks to be inclusive, flexible in their operation and quick to respond to opportunities 
and problems networks can be leveraged to benefit individuals, groups or businesses or 
society at large (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997).   
 
However, as Raab and Milward (2003) have noted networks can also have a dark 
side, where the network achievements come at the cost of other individuals, groups or 
societies.  It has been argued that the particularism of networks, that is, the banding 
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together to pursue particular or common interests, is a key element of network 
disadvantage since it can lead to exclusivity rather than an inclusive approach (Taylor 
and Hoggett 1994). Such inclusivity renders networks as essentially private rather than 
public entities and therefore not exposed to wider levels of scrutiny or subject to external 
accountability regimes. Because of this, networks can be quite secret and invisible in 
their operation and endeavours.  
 
This opaque nature of networks and their lack of transparency, coupled with 
values and norms that support clandestine actions and goals, can provide a basis for 
corruption. Granovetter (1992, p.45) points out” networks can create their own norms at 
odds with the outside world to the point where they become a ‘law unto themselves”. In 
such a context, illegal activities can take on the aura of normality and members protect 
each other from the sanctions of the outside world.   
 
 
Current Research on Criminal Networks 
 
Most of the study on criminal networks has been based on the structure of 
organised crime syndicates. The primary contemporary document on this subject is the 
United National Office of Drugs and Crime (2002) report entitled Results of a pilot 
survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries. This report 
examined forty organised crime groups and determined five typologies of organisational 
structure that range from a standard hierarchy which matches the longstanding 
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Bureaucratic Model (Cressey 1969), through to criminal networks which are loosely 
connected individuals who regularly participate in crime. However, there has been a 
growing movement away from looking at the structure to examining the network itself.  
Albini (1971) and Ianni (1972) discussed how the Mafia was based on patron-
client networks and or kinship relationships in which individuals were motivated by self 
interest.  Other research has supported the loose network picture of organised crime 
(Kleemans and de Poot 2008; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Block 1994; McIllwain 
1999) culminating in Morselli’s (2009, 55) claim that the study of hierarchical structures 
is no longer necessary. What is important for this work is not the structure of the 
syndicate but what we can learn from the network itself. That said, , there are some 
aspects of criminal networks that will help us predict the nature of a corrupt police 
network. 
 
Social Network Analysis 
Network analysis is an empirical tool which can be used to identify, measure, 
visualise (map) and analyse the ties between people, groups and organisations (Scott 
1991, p.113). It plots relationships between individuals or entities by representing them 
as nodes and showing their relationships by linking nodes with lines. Lines can have 
different depictions to indicate characteristics of links including frequency and method of 
contact. The nodes and lines form a network map that reveals relationships between 
members of the network such as gate keeping (controlling the network), liaisons and core 
and periphery members’ (Keast and Brown 2005). In doing so, it uncovers the often 
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hidden or opaque patterns of interaction and enables the underlying structure of 
relationships to become more apparent (Cross, Borgatti and Parker 2002).   
 
Network metrics, mathematical calculations or measures, make it possible to gain 
deeper insights into the actual texture and operation of the networks. The metrics applied 
to this study include: 
 
Density – In simple terms, is a measure of the number of actual connections 
compared to the total number of possible connections. The higher the density ratio - the 
higher the level of cohesion within a network. Density values range from 0 to 1: the 
closer the score to 1 the higher the level of connection.  
 
Centrality - gives an indication of how concentrated a network is – do a small 
number of people control the flow of resources, or is it distributed more widely through a 
number people. This measure provides useful insights into where influence and power 
maybe concentrated, or to the location of blockages or key flow points.  The 
centralisation score is expressed as a percentage and can vary for 0 (every member is 
connected to every other member) to 100 (all members are connected to only one 
member). A high centralisation score indicates that some network actors have many more 
connections than others. 
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Average Path Distance – is an indication of how easy it is to navigate around the 
network. This measure provides insights into how close or removed certain actors are and 
as a consequence their level of knowledge of flows. 
 
 
Police Culture and Networks 
 
Corrupt police networks may share characteristics with other types of dark networks. It is 
well established in criminology that drug trafficking operations rely on kinship and 
friendship networks to protect themselves from penetration by law enforcement agencies; 
they only deal with people they know and trust (Edwards and Levi 2008, 368; Williams 
and Godson 2002, 328; Pearson and Hobbs 2001, viii; Morselli 2001, 205). Cohesive 
networks like family relationships are ideal for criminal ventures where a strong degree 
of mutual trust is needed, especially carrying out activities with high criminal and 
financial risks (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, 90). These relationships can also be 
developed over time through empirical evidence that a non-family member is 
trustworthy. This is more likely to be seen in long standing “high end” organisations 
(CMC 2004, 4). It could be argued that a police agency is also a trust based organisation. 
Members build trust by working together in dangerous and even life-threatening 
circumstances that weed out the untrustworthy. Groups may even develop their own 
criteria for trust for example; the New South Wales CIB mantra was “you never trust a 
man that doesn’t drink” (Padraic 2005, 19).   
 
 9
Hypothesis 1: the network will only extend to those who can be trusted through 
association with a common denominator. 
 
Networks are made up of people performing specific roles. A key role is that of the 
broker who fills the spaces between nodes. Brokers are power players as they control 
communication between the parties that make up the network. In a corruption network it 
is assumed that the brokers will bring together the illicit operators outside the force with 
the police within the force who can provide them with protection. The illicit operators 
wanted support from the Joke, and that support worked because it was a syndicated 
operation rather than ad hoc arrangements between individuals. It is therefore likely that 
within the network are one or a few key persons who facilitate the communication 
between the payers and the police protectors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A small number of individuals will broker arrangements between 
the illicit operators and the police. 
 
Morselli (2009) has hypothesised that different cultures will display different network 
structures. If this is true then a corrupt network of police should be different to a criminal 
enterprise like a drug smuggling group. Also the difference should reflect the nature of 
the organisation. Smuggling operations have been plotted in the past (Chin and Zhang 
2008). These groups tend to be either highly structured in hierarchies or loosely 
structured flat networks (Natarajan and Belanger 1998, 1006). The trend is to conclude 
that drug trafficking as fluid, loosely organised, adaptable social networks (Natarajan 
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2006, 172; Mackenzie 2002, 3, Chin and Zhang 2008, 186). Rather than being a 
monolithic enterprise, drug smuggling is operated by smaller groups that interact in a 
flexible manner with different groups specialising in certain stages of the operation from 
growing the drugs, through supply to sale (Abele 2004, 34, Williams 1998, 155, 
Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, 91).  
 
A police network will probably be different because it is a network within a network, that 
is, within the Queensland Police Force. It is highly likely that the structure of the QPF 
will influence the structure of the network as the protection supplied by the police 
officers is determined by their power and jurisdiction within this agency. Thus we should 
not see officers from unrelated sections of the force, such as homicide detectives, within 
the corruption network. It should be centred on the Licensing Branch which has 
jurisdiction over the offences committed by the illicit operators. In addition, the 
hierarchical rank of the officers should play some part in the network as their authority to 
exercise discretion over raids, charges and even internal investigations should make them 
attractive to the network. Thus just as a criminal network selects it membership by the 
skill sets that are required (UN 2002) the police network will, out of necessity, have to 
select membership from those who can protect the network.  Similarly, the structure of 
the network will then, of necessity, have a pyramidal hierarchy reflecting that of the 
agency. 
 
Hypothesis 3: the structure of the corruption network will mirror the hierarchy of 
the police force thus it will have a high density. 
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Hypothesis 4: The structure will be highly centralised reflecting the bureaucratic 
structure of the QPF. This will be reflected in long average path lengths as 
communication follows the chain of command and the network will have a high 
rating of centrality. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Social network analysis can identify key actors within the network 
that can be targeted to disrupt or close down the network’s activity. 
 
Methodology 
 
The project followed three stages. First, data was extracted from police inquiries into 
corruption and the corrupt networks plotted as network maps. Then organised crime 
theory was used to examine the networks. Network analysis theories will be used to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the police networks to target strategies for 
detection, investigation and prevention.  
 
 
 Data for networks should include as much as possible of the data set, in this case 
the corrupt network. It is difficult to obtain information on criminal networks and most 
information available is unreliable. Data gathered from informers and incarcerated gang 
members cannot be checked because researchers cannot know the true size of the people 
involved. The nature of modern criminal enterprises means that membership and 
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relationships are temporary and constantly in flux. For example, a core group of criminals 
may deal with different specialists for each job. These problems are reduced in an 
examination of police corruption such as this as the raw data utilised has been compiled 
through the comprehensive investigatory and coercive powers of formal Commissions of 
Inquiry. Corruption is a routine operation as opposed to the varied operation of a criminal 
network. Payments are made regularly by the same people to the same people. Natarajan 
notes that often researchers try to establish these factors through interviews with 
participants. Obviously, there is limited scope for this option and he has demonstrated 
that network analysis can reveal a great deal about these relationships without relying on 
interviews (Natarajan 2006). Thus there is much greater certainty when studying the 
network or more qualitative data on the nature of members of the network. In this project 
the data is pre-packaged in the inquiry reports.  
 
There are limitations to this study. First, the data sources are imperfect and rely on 
evidence produced at police inquiries and reminiscences of participants. Neither source of 
data is complete. Moreover, the latter can be highly unreliable. However, these are the 
best sources available. Secondly, network maps may plot relationships that have been 
identified by a third party without the benefit of confirmation. Thus the appearance of a 
name on a map may imply an unconfirmed relationship In view of this, network maps 
should be read cautiously and only in connection with the accompanying commentary in 
which the details of relationships can be expanded. In this way, as Rogers (1987) 
contends network analysis can serve to ‘turbo charge’ case study information.  
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Given this article’s specific focus on the Queensland policy corruption networks a 
content analysis of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) report has been undertaken to distil three 
key variables of bribes, corrupt support which are central to police corruption: bribes, 
transference of bribes and corrupt support. The data used in the network maps in this 
article were specifically derived from Fitzgerald (1989) and Herbert and Gilling (2004). 
The relational data derived from the content analysis were collated and arrayed 
into matrices for each of the key variables identified above. From this starting point, 
network maps were constructed using UCINET6.  
The resulting network maps were used to provide visual representations, of the 
nature and patterns of exchanges occurring within corrupt networks as well as the overall 
architecture/topology of the network. Associated network metric measures will provide 
additional and deeper insights into the structure and operation of the networks.  
 
Analysis and Discussion: Uncovering Patterns, Structures and Roles of a Corrupt 
Police Network 
 
The Corruption Network 
 
No one knows when police corruption commenced in the Queensland Licensing Branch 
(QLB) within the Queensland Police Force (QPF). It is known however, that the corrupt 
network, or Joke, as it was known, was endemic by the 1950s. The corruption took the 
form of payments being made from bookmakers, prostitutes and operators of illegal 
gambling games to officers from the QLB in return for protection. The protection was 
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reciprocal: payers would be warned of raids by non-corrupt officers and the payers would 
provide low level employees for token arrests for the payees so that they could record a 
satisfactory 'clean up rates' for vice in Queensland. If the New South Wales’ Wood 
Commission definitions are applied the corruption was both systemic, in so far as it was 
self-perpetuating within the QLB and entrenched, because the corrupt officers had 
alliances in place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries or interference (Wood 
1977, para.2.4). In network terms the Joke was an exclusive network that maintained a 
legitimate public face, concealing an invisible web of corrupt relationships. These 
relationships had developed to a strategic level to protect the inner web from external 
examination or attack.  
 
Figure 1 has been created using the variables of bribe payments (bribe), 
distribution of bribes amongst police officers (Joke Payment), and support via illegal 
actions to ensure that the Joke is maintained and continued (corrupt support). 
Aggregating the links (bribes, joke payments and corrupt support) provides an overview 
of the structure, composition and flow of the corrupt police network in Queensland. For 
ease of reading and analysis the links have been coloured coded such that green = bribes  
, red = joke payments, and blue = corrupt support.   
 
 Overall the network presents as a loosely coupled set of connections, which 
reflects both its multiple layers of operation and an ad hoc evolution. The network centres 
on four key players: the organiser, Jack Herbert who took over the organiser role, the 
former commissioner Frank Bischof and Tony Murphy, who had formed strategic 
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relationships supporting the Joke. On the periphery are the bribers (SP bookies, 
prostitutes including Shirley Brifman, politicians such as Don Lane and illegal gaming 
operators like Robinson, Scognamiglo and Bellino), the police officers and their wives. 
 
The data used to produce this map also generated a suite of network metrics that 
afford deeper insights into the structural properties of the network. The first metric – 
density – provides an indication of the degree of cohesion evident. Table 1 sets out the 
density measures for Figure 1 (aggregate ties)  It is interesting to note that for each of the 
three relationship types or links – Bribe, Joke Payment and Corrupt Support – there is an 
escalating level of density. 
 
Table 1: Density of Network Ties  
 Density No. of Ties 
Bribe 0.0204 9 
Joke Payment 0.0272 12 
Corrupt Support 0.0567 25 
 
 
Density represents how close knit the network is, and is an indicator of the 
strength of the network.1  As the table shows with nine (9) ties the Bribe sub net is 
comprised of a small group of actors with relatively few interactions beyond the basic 
bribe exchange. This small size, coupled with a low density measure of 0.0204, indicates 
                                                 
1 Density is a ration of the number of actual ties out of the number of all possible ties with a node 
that met all the ties having a rating of 1. As the table demonstrates the density if much lower with 
ratings of 0.02 to 0.05. 
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that the Bribe sub network is loose in its structure and exhibits a low level of cohesion. 
This means that this network is small, contained and loosely coupled involving those 
people immediately involved in the Bribe exchange. The Joke Payment, is comprised of 
both a slightly higher number of ties (12) and density level (0.0272). This result makes 
sense as the participants are all Queensland police officers and most belong to the 
Licensing Branch. Alternatively, the bribe sub net group members are unconnected 
individuals who deal with the police and do not interact with each other.  
 
The third set of ties, Corrupt Support, is the event that characterises most ties in 
the network (25) and displays the highest level of density at 0.0567 for this network.  
Although this measure is low by normal standards, it is apparent that the corrupt network 
operates to provide a slightly denser web of connections that support and implicitly 
condone the illegal activities of the Bribe and Joke payment sub networks.  
 
The overall low density measures for the Network Map (aggregate ties) highlights 
the low degree of connection between actors. A loosely coupled network is a necessary 
feature for a clandestine entity (UN 2002, 30) such as the corrupt police network which 
operates mostly under the radar, with players from different areas connecting the network 
(i.e. if it was too dense the corruption would be more recognisable). Another consequence 
of its confidential nature is the network’s broken up or destructed format; one of the few 
central players is removed the network and information held between the others is 
disconnected. 
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However, this result conflicts with hypothesis 3 that a network based on the 
hierarchical QPF should have a high density reflecting the bureaucratic structure of the 
organisation. The higher density of the corrupt support network shows that there was 
greater reliance on the QPF structure to provide protection for the Licensing Branch; the 
layers of protection reflect the organisation structure as the protection is made possible by 
superior authority within the Force. Having said that, even this score is very low so we 
can conclude that while the actors’ positions within the structure played a greater role in 
corrupt support, it is still outweighed by the need for a low profile to conceal the illicit 
activity. 
 
The centrality of the network was 21.7% which is also quite low and indicates that 
the network is not controlled by one or two individuals. The players have multiple paths 
to connect with each other. This is clearly seen in figure one but there are still three 
players that dominate the map. Once again this is evidence that the QPF structure does 
not determine the structure of the network. Had the hierarchy been reflected then all paths 
would pass through Bischof the Police Commissioner; if he was the senior police officer 
everyone’s’ actions would reflect the chain of command and seek his approval to act on 
their own or communicate with other parts of the network.  Control of a bottle neck of 
pathways is power (Burt 2005, 7). As this is not the case then we can conclude that the 
network has more than one person in a position of power. As has been already stated, 
these belong to Bischof, Murphy and Herbert.  
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A further measure indicating the structure and operation of the network is the 
average path distance.  That is, how easily it is for members to make contact or 
exchanges with others. In this case the average distance among reachable pairs = 1.000. 
This means that amongst those people who are connected, on average they only need to 
travel one path/edge to reach another player they are not connected to. This finding is 
likely a feature of the relatively small size of the network.  However, it does point to the 
fact that there is little distance between actors and therefore it is unlikely that those 
involved, even those on the peripheries were not aware of the activities.  
 
 
 19
Figure 3 (Corrupt Support) extends the visual representation provided in Figure 1 
where it was noted that corrupt relations provide a foundation for the overall network. A 
more isolated and focused view of this tie reveals a point of fragility within the Joke.  
First, there were two networks of corrupt support: support between QLB officers and 
support between police and bribers. Second, the link between the two groups was 
provided by Bischof and Murphy. Given that corrupt support was essential for the Joke to 
operate the reliance on the position of Police Commissioner and a relationships facilitator 
like Murphy shows that the Joke was extremely brittle. 
A deeper interrogation of the network reveals that there exists a level of 
reciprocity between particular players. Reciprocity indicates that there is a two way, or 
reciprocal, relationship between actors. This reciprocity gives the network or the set of 
actors engaged in this behaviour a higher level of robustness, thus re-enforcing the 
actions.  While reciprocal relationships can mean the exchange of like for like, in this 
case reciprocal ties between network actors are not ties of the same relationships. 
Bookies, gamers and prostitutes paid bribes were made in return for protection, by 
Licensing Branch officers, of their illegal activies. Individual QLB officers who were 
members of the Joke would take payments of about £20/month from their "own" Starting 
Price bookmakers (SP Bookies) from all over Queensland and even over the NSW border 
(Herbert and Gilling 2004, p.55). The payments would be passed to a person known as 
the 'organiser' who would distribute the money both within the QLB and to key senior 
officers outside the Branch. Payments were not equal and the size varied with the 
importance of the officer (Fitzgerald 1989, p.32, Herbert and Gilling, p.52). The 
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organiser kept a list of the payers and their phone numbers and ensured there was always 
a Joke member on duty who could warn payers of upcoming raids.  
 
Licensing Branch officers shared their bribes with senior police in return for an 
assurance than there would be no effective investigation of their illegal activity, thus 
ensuring the protection and perpetuation of the Joke. The reciprocity was not necessarily 
provided on a one to one basis, but rather was ongoing and purposeful For example, 
Herbert collected bribes and distributed them to the officers who would protect the 
bribers. Thus some of the bribers do not have reciprocal links with Herbert and likewise 
the Unknown Licensing Branch Officers do not have reciprocal links with bribers. The 
reciprocity was provided by the network rather than the individual. Nonetheless there are 
strong reciprocal links in the centre of the network between police officers. This is 
because the protection provided by senior officers was directly reciprocal and embedded 
in the layers of trust exhibited within the network.  
 
Two different systems of trust operated: within the Licensing Branch officers 
could trust each other sufficiently for separate people to collect bribes and others to 
provide protection, while protecting the Joke was a more exclusive affair where the 
corrupt senior police did not trust others to provide the protection. Reciprocal 
relationships are the corner stone of the network. If they could be disrupted then the 
raison d’être of the Joke would cease to exist. If the Licensing Branch could not protect 
the illegal operators then they would not bribe them and if the senior police could not 
protect the Joke then they would not receive their share.  
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The Joke did not operate completely below the radar and relied on corrupt support 
when allegations of corruption arose. An example of the system of support can be 
demonstrated when the most serious threat to the Joke occurred with the National Hotel 
Inquiry in 1964 (Gibbs 1964). One of the staff of the National Hotel, a pub in central 
Brisbane, told an opposition politician that the Hotel provided free alcohol and meals to 
Bischof, Tony Murphy, and Bauer in return for them turning a blind eye to prostitution 
and after-hours sales of alcohol. Despite two employees coming forward to give evidence 
in support of the claims, the Inquiry did not find any proof of wrong-doing. This was 
assisted by officers, such as Herbert, and other witnesses such as Shirley Brifman, a 
prostitute who had worked at the National Hotel, giving false evidence before the 
Inquiry. Joke members were also willing to take direct action to protect themselves. This 
mainly took the form of discrediting or professionally destroying their enemies, but on 
rare occasions more serious action was taken. For example, in 1971, Shirley Brifman 
made claims to the media that she had perjured herself before the National Hotel Inquiry 
and spelt out the corruption that was occurring. Brifman was subsequently interviewed by 
Queensland police officers, and in 1972 charges were laid against Tony Murphy for 
perjury. But this case fell over when Brifman died of a drug overdose a month later. 
Unsubstantiated allegations have been made by Brifman's family that Tony Murphy 
forced Brifman to commit suicide (Fitzgerald 1989, p.34). 
 
Figure 2 allows us to make some conclusions about Hypothesis 1, namely that 
membership was based on shared characteristics and this occurred differently for two 
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groups within the network. Firstly, membership of the group providing protection to the 
illicit gambling operators was based on holding a position within the Licensing Branch 
and passing a vetting process by Herbert, the organiser. Membership of group that 
protected prostitutes was based on trust built on years of companionship in the QPF and 
that fell to Bischof and the members of the Rat Pack, Murphy, Lewis and Hallahan. 
Protection of the Licensing Branch fell almost exclusively to the power of the 
Commissioner, Bischof and his successor, Norwin Bauer. The latter place was based on 
the monopoly of power over investigations into the actions of police officers. Note that 
there is not a path between Bischof and the Licensing Branch officers. The SP Bookies 
and prostitutes were protected via the provision of warnings about raids; the protectors 
protected the bribers from the actions of their honest compatriots. Conversely, the 
Commissioner did not provide protection to the Licensing Branch through action but via 
the omission to act on clear indications that something was amiss within this branch of 
the Force.  
 
Identifying Key Actors  
The following map demonstrates a further vulnerability of the network in the form of its 
key players. The map identifies the key actors by the size of the boxes for each player. 
The three largest boxes are Frank Bischof, Tony Murphy and Jack Herbert. Potentially 
the removal of one or all of these from the network could disrupt or end the Joke.  
 
Bischof was not present in the network for the duration of the period under 
review. Bischof was made Police Commissioner in 1958. He had been a member of the 
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Joke for some years and used his position of authority to support its continuation 
(Fitzgerald 1989, p.31).He retired and was replaced by Norwin Bauer. This event did not 
disrupt the network because Bauer was already a member of the Joke and maintained the 
supervisory and protective role of his predecessor. Jack Herbert likewise took over this 
position from a string of former organisers. Herbert was transferred to the Licensing 
Branch 1959 and stayed till 1974 (Fitzgerald 1989, p.32). Herbert was made the organiser 
in 1964 because he kept the phone numbers of SP Bookies up to date (Herbert and 
Gilling 2004, p.52). Once in this position he also became responsible for initiating new 
members to the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989, p.33). When he was away Herbert's wife Peggy 
used to take new phone numbers from SPs and pass them on to other officers. According 
to Herbert, half of the QLB officers were members of the Joke and most of their wives 
knew they were (Herbert and Gilling 2004, pp.53-54). Herbert could conceivably be 
replaced just as he had replaced a previous organiser. Murphy, on the other hand, played 
a more significant role. His power in the network was dependent on his relationships 
rather than his position. He held this influential role while serving in a number of jobs 
both within and outside the Licensing Branch. It appears his function was as a 
relationships facilitator. Thus he would not easily have been replaced by another corrupt 
officer backfilling his position. The only possible successor with similar relationships 
was Terry Lewis. Murphy’s removal would have severely disrupted, if not ended, the 
network. 
 
The network also benefitted from a further layer of political alliances which could 
legitimately frustrate attempts to investigate or terminate the Joke. The primary player 
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was the Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE). There is no evidence that the 
union executive were aware of corrupt activity but the QPUE always took the stance of 
defending members against allegations of corruption and consequently obfuscating the 
actions of those who tried to bring change to the Police Force (Fitzgerald 1989, p.35). In 
the National Hotels Inquiry, the QPUE provided legal support to 88 officers who were 
named by investigators (Fitzgerald 1989, p.34). Further support came from the Premier of 
Queensland, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who made a political alliance with the QPUE. 
The Premier did his best to stop change occurring in the QPF in return for the public 
support of the QPUE and police officers for his hard-line law and order policies 
(Fitzgerald 1989, p.36). Once again there is no evidence that Bjelke-Petersen had 
knowledge of, or received any payments from, the Joke. 
 
Network Disruption 
 
The “Joke’ network was not indestructible and it only took ‘a few good men’ to bring it 
down. The first of these was Allen Hodges who upon becoming Minister of Police in 
May 1969, began instituting changes in the QPF in accordance with a review conducted 
by South Australian Police Commissioner, John McKinna. One of his first reforms was to 
replace Bauer as Police Commissioner with Ray Whitrod, a non-Queenslander. Whitrod 
was a righteously honest officer who tried to clean up the Queensland Police Force and 
modernise its operation. This annoyed the rank and file membership and created an 
immediate and long-lasting conflict with the QPUE and by association, the Premier. One 
of Whitrod's reforms was to set up the Crime Intelligence Unit (CIU) under Gulbransen 
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with the power to investigate police and specific instructions to keep watch on the QLB 
(Fitzgerald 1989, p.38). He also transferred Tony Murphy and Terry Lewis to country 
postings away from the action of the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989, p.43).  
 
These developments alone would not have been enough to close down the Joke. 
The outer layer of support mobilised with the QPUE and the Premier openly opposing the 
new Commissioner. The QPUE, with Bjelke-Petersen’s acquiescence, advised its 
members not to cooperate with CIU (Fitzgerald 1989, p.38) and actively opposing 
Whitrod’s reforms and denied his allegations of corruption in the QLB (Fitzgerald 1989, 
p.36). But the removal of Bauer, Murphy and Lewis meant that the corrupt support 
network was broken; the new police commissioner was not only a non-member of the 
Joke but actively opposed corruption, also both the relationship facilitator, Murphy, and 
his only possible replacement, Lewis, were geographically isolated from each other and 
the Joke. But the end of the Joke came when appointed Bill Osborne as head of the QLB. 
Osborne had been a member of the Branch for 10 years and knew how the Joke worked, 
even if he was never a member. Osborne informed Herbert that the Joke had to stop. The 
members had to comply because Osborne's knowledge of the system meant they couldn't 
trick him and keep the Joke going (Herbert and Gilling 2004, p.74). Herbert and others 
transferred out of QLB in 1974 (Fitzgerald 1989, p.38) Herbert went to the Public 
Relations Office and retired medically unfit 3 months later. The Joke couldn't continue 
without a senior officer involved (Herbert and Gilling 2004, pp.74-75). Future research 
will discuss the return of corruption, known as the Second Joke, when the corrupt support 
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network was re-established by the appointment of Lewis as Police Commissioner in 
Whitrod’s stead, and the reappointment of Murphy to Brisbane.  
 
Implications  
 
The analysis conducted in this article makes it possible to reach clear conclusions 
about the nature of this particular police corruption network after testing the five 
hypotheses. The review has shown that the corrupt police network, while organised, 
nonetheless exhibits a different structural and functioning to conventional organisation 
and other criminal networks. 
 
Hypothesis 1: the network will only extend to those who can be trusted through 
association with a common denominator, was supported. Membership of the three groups 
of protection were determined by a position in the Licensing Branch and passage of a 
vetting process, existing membership in the Rat Pack, or, in the case of protecting the 
Licensing Branch, possession of the position of Police Commissioner. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A small number of individuals will broker arrangements between 
the illicit operators and the police, was not supported. While Herbert conducted the day to 
day operation of the Joke, individual officers independently brokered connections and 
took payments which they then passed to Herbert. Thus there was a low level of control 
over the operation of the network; a point which will be returned to under Hypothesis 4.  
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Hypothesis 3: the structure of the corruption network will mirror the hierarchy of 
the police force thus it will have a high density, was disproved. Other than the necessity 
of having the participation of the Police Commissioner, there is almost no mirroring of 
the police hierarchy in the structure of the Joke network. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The structure will be highly centralised reflecting the pyramidal 
structure of the QPF. This will be reflected in long average path lengths as 
communication follows the network will have a high rating of centrality. Both average 
path lengths and centrality did not indicate the reliance on the chain of command in the 
operation of the network. There was no single authority over the network which was a 
diffuse group of individuals providing support on an ongoing basis based on ad hoc 
relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Social network analysis can identify key actors within the network 
that can be targeted to disrupt or close down the network’s activity, was supported. Three 
individuals played the major roles in the Joke: Herbert, Murphy and the Police 
Commissioner. These identifications matched the vulnerability of the network 
demonstrated by history. Herbert was dispensable as he was already simply a 
replacement for a number of previous organisers. Murphy was more important because 
he was the facilitator and his position could only be taken by Lewis. Finally, it was 
essential that the Joke have the Police Commissioner as a member. When Whitrod was 
made commissioner and he transferred both Murphy, and his replacement Lewis, the Joke 
closed down.  
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This network is unique for criminal networks as it exists within an organisation. 
Whilst it is well recognised that organisations contain networks, the research on criminal 
networks is able to examine groups that by necessity exist independent of another non-
criminal organisation (Morselli 2001, 2003 and 2009, Morselli and Roy 2008). The Joke 
was operated by members of a legitimate organisation, namely the Queensland Police 
Force. This created considerations for its operation that did not exist for criminal groups. 
A criminal enterprise needs members that can perform specific tasks, for example, a drug 
smuggling enterprise needs technical skills for preparing drugs, operating sea or air craft, 
and brokerage agents with connections for purchase and sale (Thompson 2008). The 
members of the Joke needed brokers but they also needed to include and placate key 
people not because of the skills or their ability to broker bribes, but because of their 
position within the Queensland Police Force and their power to close down the corrupt 
network. These individuals were more than brokers; they extorted the operation by 
holding it for ransom. The prime example of this was Frank Bischof the Police 
Commissioner.  
 
Another unique aspect to this group was the layers of protection provided by the 
network. The Licensing Branch provided corrupt support in the form of protection for the 
bribers, namely the operators of illegal gambling and prostitution. The senior police then 
provided corrupt support in the form of protection for the members of the Licensing 
Branch. The Premier and QPUE provided legitimate political support and protection as a 
by product, to the senior police.   
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There are three avenues for further research based on this project. The first is to 
determine further strengths and weaknesses of the networks via organisational theory and 
establish practical strategies for detection, investigation and prevention within the police 
service. A further step will be to map the Second Joke. This will be followed by network 
analysis of the corrupt networks investigated by the Wood Royal Commission in New 
South Wales (Wood 1997) and the Kennedy Inquiry in Western Australia (Kennedy 
2004).  
 
When the project is complete the methodology can be repeated in other 
jurisdictions. For example, there are a plethora of inquiries into police corruption in the 
United States of America which could be examined. The project could be also be 
repeated in other corrupt networks. Many non-policing public officials with significant 
decision making powers can also act in a predatory manner, for example, licensing, 
housing, and other agencies in which an official has the ability to affect the livelihood or 
basic standard of living of their clients. An immediate opportunity would come from the 
New South Wales ICAC investigations into corruption in Rail Corp (Independent 
Commission Against Corruption 2008). The findings of this research can be used for 
further projects to determine preventative and investigative strategies that could be 
applied to all government agencies.  
 
Conclusion 
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This article is the commencement of a project to analyse police corruption networks in 
Australia. It has covered the initial study of the Joke, a bribery network operating in 
Queensland from the 1950s to the 1970s.  The network was examined by testing of five 
hypotheses developed from the literature on criminal networks. They were based in part 
on the proposal by Morselli (2009) that the nature of a network would form within the 
culture of the environment in which it operated. If this were true in this circumstance then 
the operation of a corruption network within the structured hierarchy of the Queensland 
Police Force should reflect this hierarchy in its operation. This was found to not be the 
case in this Queensland instance. Similarly, another hypothesis that secrecy would 
require that a small number of individuals act as brokers with the bribers was also 
discovered to be untrue for the Joke. Two hypotheses were supported: membership of the 
groups within the Joke were bases on shared characteristics; and, the use of social 
network analysis tools correctly identified the vulnerabilities within the network, namely, 
the participants who, if removed, would disrupt or close down the network. 
 
This study has demonstrated that the ‘Joke’ exhibited many of the characteristics 
of a ‘dark’ network.  A set of internal norms ordered relations and behaviours allowed for 
the formation of a loose membership extending to higher levels of police and political 
authority. Entrenched by implicit and explicit support the Joke was hidden within the 
legitimate operation of the Queensland police service. By uncovering the patterns of 
relationship, composition and key actors network analysis has provided those responsible 
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for the policing of corrupt police networks.  In short, network analysis provides a way to 
move beyond intuition to informed decision making.  
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Figure 1: Aggregate Linkages 
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Figure 2: Reciprocal Relationships 
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Figure 3: Corrupt Support   
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Figure 4: Key Actors 
 
 
 
